

**MEMORANDUM FOR:**

STAT

does not believe there is a need for a pre-SECOM meeting. She has highlighted a couple of items in the attached which you should focus on before the meeting.

STAT



STAT

Date 4/30/85

SECRET

25X1

**ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET****SUBJECT:** (Optional)

283rd SECOM Meeting

FRC

NO.

DATE

30 April 1985

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S  
INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

D/S

30 APR  
1985Attached is the package for the  
1 May 1985 SECOM meeting.

2.

Two action items for D/S,  
highlighted in yellow, are:

3.

° Two nominees for the  
Personal Security course to be  
submitted by 1 May.

4.

° Possibility of issuing a  
Notice to staff employees and  
retirees regarding the

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

25X1

25X1  
25X1

25X1

**CONFIDENTIAL**

**Two-Hundred and Eighty-third Meeting**

**Wednesday, 1 May 1985**

**Room 7D32, CIA Headquarters**

**CONFIDENTIAL**

*Alpina*

**CONFIDENTIAL**  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

\*SECOM-A-274

19 April 1985

**AGENDA**  
Two Hundred and Eighty-third Meeting  
Wednesday, 1 May 1985, 10:00 a.m.  
Room 7D32, CIA Headquarters

Special Briefing by Charles Allen, NIO for Terrorism, on security aspects  
of the terrorist threat

Preliminary Comments (e.g., [redacted] position; Project Slammer;  
leak matters; personal security course; hearings and briefings)

25X1

ITEM 1 Approval of Minutes of 3 April meeting

ITEM 2 New Business

ITEM 3 Next Meeting - 10:00 a.m., Wednesday 29 May 1985, room 7D32, CIA  
Headquarters

25X1

**CONFIDENTIAL**

Comment

## CONFIDENTIAL

## AGENDA COMMENTS

SPECIAL BRIEFING By Charles Allen, NIO for Terrorism.

PRELIMINARY COMMENTS On 25 April, [ ] advised that the following comments would probably be addressed at the beginning of the SECOM meeting:

25X1

LEAK MATTERS The Gunman leak will be discussed and the fact that it will be referred to the Department of Justice through the Office of General Counsel.

SECOM STAFF The new SECOM Staff Member from the FBI, Gary Stoops, will be introduced. Members will be notified that [ ] contract will soon run out. There is still no replacement for [ ] and SECOM may have to cancel the Adjudicator's Seminar.

25X1

25X1

PROJECT SLAMMER The Working Group will begin meetings on Monday and Tuesday, 29 and 30 April. C/SECOM will report on the status of those deliberations. Members on the working group include Dr. Hibler; Special Agent Richard Alt, FBI;

25X1

25X1

[ ] Dr. McCarroll, Walter Reed Army Hospital; [ ] ORD/CIA; [ ] NSA; Dr. Hyland, NIS; Dr. Bloom, Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center; Martin Hirschowitz, DOE; Calvin Wood, Department of Justice; [ ] DIA. Special Agent Roseanne Russell, FBI; [ ] Major Donna Zelo, Army Intelligence, Fort Meade; and [ ]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Jerry Rubino, DOJ, has provided a computer print out of the names and places of incarceration for those individuals suggested for the Project Slammer study to the working group.

SECOM BUDGET ITEMS Those items that were approved at the last SECOM meeting for inclusion in SECOM budgeting have been submitted to the IC Staff for concurrence.

SECOM EXECUTIVE SEMINAR [ ]

25X1

25X1

PFIAB Briefing The members will be told about the briefing C/SECOM and [ ] gave to PFIAB staffers on TSCS and that the PFIAB members will next be briefed on this topic. C/SECOM report on that briefing is attached as Tab A.

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PERSONAL SECURITY COURSE Members are beginning to show some interest in the course since a sample "hands on" session has been offered to members by [REDACTED]. Members have been asked to select a primary and a secondary candidate for the 4 May (Saturday) session. (attached as Tab B) Deadline is 1 May for SECOM.

25X1  
25X1

4C PROGRAM As a follow on to the last SECOM meeting, C/SSC and the 4C Program managers met with representatives of the DOD 4C users in the Pentagon on 24 April. The meeting provided a useful forum for the exchange of ideas and allowed the users to become aware of improvements and new procedures. [REDACTED] representative indicated that any problems they had have now been solved. All agreed to meet periodically in the future.

25X1

ITEM 1 Approval of Minutes of 3 April 1985 meeting.

ACTION TAKEN RE THE MINUTES

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE FUTURE Nominee submitted to SECOM.

EXTRACT FROM AF SCI SECURITY ADVISOR --The document and OS's response are attached as Tab C.

ITEM 2 New Business

AIR FORCE CABLE ON LEAKS--ATTACHED AS Tab D is a copy of a message sent by the Air Force member to the Special Security Officers of his department concerning the [REDACTED] request for information. SAG had also received a copy and has inquired, through PPG, if D/S wishes to issue such a notice to staff employees and retirees as indicated in SECOM's suggestion. Also attached is the cable that was issued to contractors on this Subject and was coordinated by OGC. As you may recall, [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1  
25X1

ITEM 3 NEXT MEETING -10:00 AM Wednesday 29 May room 7D32 Headquarters.

OTHER SECOM MATTERS: Attached is correspondence between the DCI, Director of OPM and Mr. Weinberger regarding the Federal Personnel Program. C/SECOM's response to the DCI on this topic is also attached for your information. C/SECOM advised the DCI

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

that there is no reason for CIA to get involved in the dispute between DoD and OPM. PPG provided the same direction, verbally, to the DDA staff for the DCI on Thursday, 25 April for his Friday meeting with Mr. Weinberger. All documents on this subject are attached as TAB E.

CONFIDENTIAL

A

Date

## ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL S.

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)		Initials	Date
1.	DD/PA m	S	4/18
2.			
3.	C/PP6	nhu	4/22
4.	C/POLICY	JR	4/23/85
5.			

File		Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

REMARKS

25X1

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
	Phone No.

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)  
 Prescribed by GSA  
 FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

\* SECOM-D-115  
16 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff

FROM: [REDACTED]

Chairman

25X1

SUBJECT: PFIAB Staff Meeting on TSCM [REDACTED]

25X1

1. On 11 April 1985, [REDACTED] Chairman of SECOM's Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Subcommittee (TSCS), [REDACTED] Executive Secretary, TSCS, and I briefed Dan Carlin and Randy Ford of the PFIAB Staff on technical surveillance countermeasures (TSCM) in the Intelligence Community.

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

4. The "low profile" of the TSCS was explained by pointing out that all agencies with TSCM capabilities participate in the subcommittee's activities and that the indiscriminate dissemination of technical data on finds is likely to be counterproductive. The TSCM organizations are kept informed and are provided guidance on countermeasures. [REDACTED] provided several samples of TSCS technical publications for review by the PFIAB staff members. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

SECRET [REDACTED]

SECRET

25X1

25X1

8. The meeting seemed to be mutually beneficial and lasted approximately two hours.

25X1  
25X1

cc: C/TSCS  
D/OS/CIA

SECRET

25X1



**CONFIDENTIAL**  
**DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**  
**Security Committee**

SECOM-D-129

19 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members

FROM:

[Redacted]

Chairman

25X1

SUBJECT: Personal Security Course

1. At the 3 April meeting of SECOM, [Redacted] briefed the members on their program of training personnel in how to respond to and deal with terrorist attacks and street crime. They invited SECOM members to send qualified personnel to be trained to present similar programs in their respective organizations and to assist in the multi-agency workload faced by the three-man team.

25X1

25X1

2. [Redacted] advised that the team is willing to present a "hands-on" (literally) session for SECOM members or their designees from 0900 to 1700, 4 May 1985. Since the optimum number of trainees is 20, and some members probably will not participate, you are invited to nominate a primary and a secondary candidate for this session. Please let me know by 1 May 1985, in order to complete arrangements.

25X1

25X1

[Redacted]

**CONFIDENTIAL**

25X1

C



## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

Extract from AF SCI Security Advisory

FROM

EXTENSION

NO.

DATE

18 April 1985

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

RECEIVED

FORWARDED

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

1.

C/Policy Branch

4/22/85 JR

Attached is response to SECOM tasking regarding subject.

2.

3.

C/PPG

4/22/85 mhu

4.

5.

DD/P&amp;M

4/22/85 D

6.

7.

~~DD/S~~

8.

9.

D/S

22 APR 1985

22 APR 1985

K

10.

APG

11.

12.

13.

25X1

25X1

22 APR 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, SECOM

FROM:

SECOM Member

STAT

SUBJECT: Extract from AF SCI Security Advisory

REFERENCE: A. SECOM document dated 27 March 1985, Same Subject  
B. SECOM-M-287, dated 4 April 1985, Same Subject

1. This memorandum is in response to Chairman, SECOM's request to review referenced subject and advise the Security Committee if it, or part of it, should be made Community Policy.

2. The thrust of the statement contains a valid suggestion and should be endorsed as community policy. However, it is suggested that the wording be changed to read, "The appearance in the media of classified intelligence information does not constitute declassification. Persons who, because of their former or current briefed status, are aware of the accuracy of such unauthorized disclosures must not lend them credence by using them in any public medium. The mere acknowledgment of the person's military title..."

STAT

!OS/P&M/PPG (18 Apr 85)!  
!Retyped 22 Apr 85!

STAT

!Distribution:!

! Orig - Adse!  
! 1 - D/S Chrono!  
! ① - PPG Chrono!  
! 1 - OS Registry!

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

D

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY  
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

SECOM-D-126  
18 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members

FROM:

Chairman

SUBJECT: Avoiding Unauthorized Disclosures

STAT

1. Attached is a copy of a message the Air Force member sent Special Security Officers of his department concerning unauthorized disclosures. The security education advice provided by  is applicable to the Intelligence Community as a whole. The type of solicitation involved could well appear in a variety of other journals.

STAT

2. Members are requested to consider issuing similar reminders to cleared personnel of their organizations, and, where the means exist through retiree associations, to former personnel. The recipients of such reminders should be cautioned against any discussion of subjects that they dealt with on a classified basis, and advised of their continuing obligations to submit for prepublication review any written material concerning SCI which they contemplate publishing or providing journalists, scholars or any uncleared persons. Members are also requested to advise the SECOM staff of other instances coming to their attention in which magazines contain solicitations for information on past or present intelligence activities.

STAT

Attachment:

AFSSO/INS message 151255Z APR 85

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

**UNCLASSIFIED**C/SECOM  
INCOMING

/46/

FRP: . . . . .

NON-AGENCY

ACTION: NONE  
SECUR/SSC-3.

(8/W)

INFO: RF, FILE, CSFILE, C/SECOM, DDO/SCO, MPB/GG.

85 7023217

NUR

PAGE 001

TOR: 151600Z APR 85

RR [ ] #2293 1051433  
 DE [ ]  
 ZNY MMNSH  
 ZKZK RR XAA DE  
 R 151255Z APR 85  
 FM AFSSO USAF //INS//  
 TO ROXAD  
 ZEM  
 UNCLAS

STAT

0000  
 FOR SSO OR EQUIVALENT AT EACH LOCATION - KEEP AND PASS/ADVISE ALL  
 AIR FORCE ORGANIZATIONS/ACTIVITIES/ELEMENTS YOU SUPPORT AS SHOWN IN  
 THE DIA COMPARTMENTED ADDRESS BOOK OR USSID 505; JOINT SERVICE SSO'S  
 HOLD OR PASS TO RESPECTIVE AF ELEMENT AS APPROPRIATE; ADDITIONAL  
 PASSING INSTRUCTIONS ARE AS FOLLOWS: 6920ESG PASS TO 6920ESG/SP. DET  
 422 AND 2114CS; 6931ESS FOR 6931ESS/SP; AFSSO AFCC KEEP AND PASS TO  
 CG; 6912ESG FOR 6912ESG/SPA; SSO DMAAC KEEP AND PASS TO DET 1 1974  
 TO 25AD/DOI; COMFAIRKEF PASS TO AFI/DOI; SSO 15AF HOLD AND PASS TO  
 AFISC/IGTI AND 26AD/DOI; USSOUTHCOM KEEP AND PASS TO 24COMPWG/DOI;  
 ESC/IN KEEP AND PASS TO ATC/TTQI - ATC HOLD FOR AFMPC/ROS4E; SSO  
 ADCOM KEEP AND PASS TO AFAITC/SVA; CIA PASS TO CHAIRMAN, SECOM;  
 DIRNSA PASS TO DOD COMPUTER SECURITY CENTER/C4 (LT COL CRAIG); AFSSO  
 RADC KEEP AND PASS TO 21AD/DOI; AFSSO FTD KEEP AND PASS TO AFLC/INS  
 SUBJ: JEFFREY RICHELSON REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (ROXAD 22-85)  
 REF: AFSSO USAF/INS 271312Z MAR 85, ROXAD 17-85  
 1. REF ADVISED OF A RECENTLY PUBLISHED BOOK BY JEFFREY RICHELSON  
 TITLED "US INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY." THE MARCH 85 EDITION OF AIR  
 FORCE MAGAZINE (PG 21) CONTAINS A LETTER BY RICHELSON SOLICITING  
 INFORMATION ON US INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION OPERATIONS DIRECTED AGAINST  
 THE SOVIET UNION BETWEEN 1945-60. RICHELSON IS "INTERESTED IN HEAR-  
 ING FROM ANYONE INVOLVED IN AIRBORNE PERIPHERAL PHOTOGRAPHIC OR ELEC-  
 TRONIC RECONNAISSANCE MISSIONS DURING THESE YEARS AS WELL AS FROM  
 ANYONE INVOLVED IN COLLECTION OPERATIONS CONCERNING SOVIET NUCLEAR  
 TESTING." THIS SOLICITATION MAY APPEAR IN OTHER PERIODICALS.  
 2. WHILE WE DO NOT DISCOURAGE ACADEMIC RESEARCH, SUCH SOLICITATIONS  
 MAY BE A VEHICLE FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES. INFORMATION FROM THE  
 PERIOD CITED ABOVE MAY STILL BE CLASSIFIED OR BE SUBJECT TO DOD/AF  
 SECURITY REVIEW PRIOR TO RELEASE. INDIVIDUALS WHO RESPOND TO SUCH  
 SOLICITATIONS LEAVE THEMSELVES OPEN TO EXPANDED QUESTIONING BY THE  
 INTERVIEWER, QUESTIONING WHICH MAY GO BEYOND THE INITIAL SCOPE OF THE  
 INQUIRY INTO SENSITIVE OR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION. IT MAY ALSO BE A  
 MEANS FOR AN INTERVIEWER/RESEARCHER TO CONFIRM INFORMATION PREVIOUSLY  
 OBTAINED FROM OTHER SOURCES. IN SHORT, PERSONNEL WHO HAVE BEEN  
 INVOLVED IN INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS ARE CAUTIONED REGARDING THE  
 IMPLICATIONS OF SOLICITATIONS SUCH AS THAT OUTLINED ABOVE. EXPERI-  
 ENCE SHOWS THESE HAVE BECOME A CONDUIT FOR UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES.  
 3. WE ASK THAT YOU CIRCULATE THIS GUIDANCE TO CURRENTLY CLEARED  
 PERSONNEL, PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICERS, AND TO LOCAL SERVICE ORGANIZA-  
 TIONS WHICH MAY HAVE RETIRED MILITARY/CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WHO WERE  
 INVOLVED IN US INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS EITHER AS A PARTICIPANT OR  
 USER OF INTELLIGENCE. WE VIEW THIS PRIMARILY AS "IN-HOUSE" EDUCA-  
 TION EFFORT AT THIS TIME. YOUR ASSISTANCE AND SUPPORT IS  
 APPRECIATED.  
 END OF MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

**UNCLASSIFIED**

## ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

18 Apr 75

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,  
building, Agency/Post)

Initials

Date

1.

C/OPS/PSI

D

18 Apr 1975

2.

DY/PSI

J

19 Apr 1975

3.

DD/PSM

S

4/17

4.

CISAC

5.

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	For Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

## REMARKS

I have sent copies to George Handler, C/PAO,  
and [redacted] OGC (Publication Review Board).

This info should be disseminated by either [redacted]

5041-102

★ GPO : 1983 O - 381-529 (301)

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)  
Prescribed by GSA  
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

STAT

STAT

## ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)		Initials	Date
1.	AC/LIA		
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

## REMARKS

a.) Find out if SECOM is doing anything about a community wide notice or whatever. IF not

b.) Determine the system for Agency wide notices and prepare a memo under [redacted] signature then appropriate chain to

c.) As cover gerants retirees (CIND, should be notified too by a mailer. This might be requested in same memo for (b) above.

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)	Room No.—Bldg.
[redacted]	Phone No.

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)  
Prescribed by GSA  
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

STAT

STAT

**ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP**

Date

21 Feb 1985

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number,  
building, Agency/Post)

Initials

Date

1. ADD/S&amp;T

6E-56 Headquarters

2.

3.

4.

5.

Action	File	Note and Return
Approval	For Clearance	Per Conversation
As Requested	For Correction	Prepare Reply
Circulate	For Your Information	See Me
Comment	Investigate	Signature
Coordination	Justify	

**REMARKS**

I thought you would be interested in seeing the wire sent to contractors pursuant to your suggestion in DDS&T-083-85 (attached).

STAT

STAT

Atts

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post)

Room No.—Bldg.

Director of Security

Phone No.

STAT

☆ GPO : 1983 O - 381-529 (301)

Prescribed by GSA  
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

**Distribution:**

Orig - Adse

1 - OS Registry



**Page Denied**

DDS&T-083-85

1 February 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, Security Committee

FROM: James V. Hirsch  
Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology

SUBJECT: Leaks of Classified Information

1. It seems to me that we in government unwittingly aid one of the major sources of leaks of classified information we suffer from today. The source I refer to is the group of self-proclaimed intelligence pundits associated with specialized study centers or institutes. These individuals openly publish or discuss details of our collection sources and analysis results. The ones who can do the most damage are those who have had prior legitimate access to classified information. This inside knowledge is often used to pick selectively from the media that information that is very close to the truth for use in public unclassified papers or discussions. In this way erroneous data are gradually sifted out of these analysts' treatment a given classified issue. Some of these analysts have been careful to identify prior open sources for their specific studies. I know of one case of a strategic analyst, a foreigner, who managed to associate himself with U.S. think-tanks and, by insinuation of SCI access, managed to elicit classified information in his discussions. Recently, a subpanel on technical collection of intelligence of an unclassified symposium on strategic issues advertised the participation of an individual who used to work with one of our contractors and who held a number of our SCI clearances.

2. The currency of this particular source of intelligence leakage constantly decays without access to inside information. If we could isolate these sources of leaks from so-called unclassified governmental or government contractor interaction, their effectiveness would be significantly diminished. It doesn't make sense for one part of the government to rail against intelligence leakage while other parts cheerfully participate in open forums with individuals who systematically use such exchanges to confirm or deny classified information already in the public domain. It would seem prudent for us to investigate ways in which we can prevent government and government contractor participation in unclassified conferences when there is a risk that by doing so we could aid in verifying the accuracy of intelligence information appearing in unclassified published materials. We gain little or nothing of substance from many of these exchanges, especially when technical collection of intelligence is the topic. Would it be possible

25X1

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBJECT: Leaks of Classified Information

for your committee to develop guidelines to limit the participation of Intelligence Community organizations and their contractors in unclassified symposia, conferences or technical meetings dealing with intelligence when such participation could aid in establishing the credibility of known leakers of classified information?

25X1



James V. Hirsch

E

STAT



25 April 1985

FOR:   
SECOM Member

STAT

FROM:

STAT

Attached is for your information.

